Heat, light, magnetism, electricity, galvanism (until recently known as imponderable bodies) are now considered as modifications of force; but, in my opinion, the time will come when they will be known as disturbances."
— from Etidorhpa; or, The End of Earth. The Strange History of a Mysterious Being and the Account of a Remarkable Journey by John Uri Lloyd

“Ah, well, you see, we had the improved taste of this age to guide us,” remarked Kate.
— from Down the River to the Sea by Agnes Maule Machar

It does give us real knowledge about them.
— from Ontology, or the Theory of Being by P. (Peter) Coffey

Metaphor is not equivocation; but perhaps more usually it is understood not to give us real knowledge because it is understood to be based on resemblances that are merely fanciful , not real.
— from Ontology, or the Theory of Being by P. (Peter) Coffey

By using these notions as predicates of our judgments we are enabled to interpret things, to obtain a genuine if inadequate insight into reality; for we assume as established in the Theory of Knowledge that all our universal concepts have real and objective validity, that they give us real knowledge of the nature of those individual things which form the data of our sense experience.
— from Ontology, or the Theory of Being by P. (Peter) Coffey

F. von Bezold, E. Gotheim und R. Koser:
— from The Age of the Reformation by Preserved Smith

Ludmilla, to my joy, soon gave up reading "Kamchadalka."
— from In the World by Maksim Gorky

Depend upon it, in the time when there were real live ogres in real caverns or castles, gobbling up real knights and virgins, when they went into the world—the neighboring market-town, let us say, or earl's castle—though their nature and reputation were pretty well known, their notorious foibles were never alluded to.
— from Roundabout Papers by William Makepeace Thackeray

Kassel, R., Untersuchungen zur griechischen und römischen Konsolationsliteratur .
— from The Last Poems of Ovid by Ovid

So far from implying {129} scepticism as to the power of Reason, this opposition between faith and sight actually asserts the possibility of attaining by thought to a knowledge of realities which cannot be touched or tasted or handled—a knowledge of equal validity and trustworthiness with that which is popularly said to be due to the senses, though Plato has taught us once for all[1] that the senses by themselves never give us real knowledge, and that in the apprehension of the most ordinary matter of fact there is implied the action of the self-same intellect by which alone we can reach the knowledge of God.
— from Philosophy and Religion Six Lectures Delivered at Cambridge by Hastings Rashdall